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CHAPTER TWO
AGGRESSION IN TERRORISM
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Abstract: Behavioral scientists have attempted to describe and explain terroristic aggression in various ways. Acts of terrorism
have typically been labeled as instrumentally aggressive in nature, however,  we  argue  that  this  descriptor  is  insufficient  in
capturing the complexity of terroristic aggression. In light of this, we propose a  new  term  called  “programmatic  aggression”
that may better serve to capture the multiple  levels  of  influence  in  generating  terroristic  aggression.  We  also  review  how
personality and psychopathological models and theories of aggression, including the  frustration-aggression  hypothesis,  social
learning theory, and the General Aggression Model, have been applied and fall short in the explication of terroristic aggression.
Finally, we  suggest  some  future  directions  of  research  that  would  likely  benefit  the  study  of  terrorism  and  aggression,
including analysis of social psychological work on group dynamics and their influence on  individual  and  group  behavior,  as
well as forensic risk and threat assessment research that could inform future efforts at predicting and hopefully, preventing acts
of terroristic aggression.
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“When man had reached  the  stage  of  having  weapons,  clothing,  and  social  organization,  so  overcoming  the  dangers  of
starving, freezing, and being eaten by wild animals, and these dangers ceased to be the essential  factors  influencing  selection,
an evil intra-specific selection must have set in. The factor  influencing  selection  was  now  the  wars  waged  between  hostile
neighboring tribes.”
—Lorenz, On Aggression, 1966, pg. 39
Aggression, whether expressed by the leaders or  the  members  of  a  terrorist  group,  is  a  central  component  of
terrorism; characterized by the defined rationale of a violent outcome with the intent to elicit fear and terror based  on
social, political and/or religious reasons (e.g., see WordNet, 2009; The Free Dictionary, 2009).  This  “outcome”  has
been important since the term terrorism was first popularized during the  “Reign  of  Terror”  in  France  in  the  1790s
(Hoffman, 1998)1. During this period of the French  Revolution,  conflict  between  rival  political  parties  resulted  in
indiscriminate aggression and violence by the state against its civilian population. Tens of thousands  of  people  were
killed over a period of approximately ten months for the  purpose  of  instilling  fear  in  the  public  and  preventing  a
counter-revolution. Several thousands were executed in public as part of educational propaganda (Kerr, 1927).
Since the “Reign of Terror,” numerous definitions of terrorism have emerged  that  encompass
aggression and violence (or the threat of such behavior) as major components  of  terroristic  acts
(Laqeuer, 1999). For example, the  United  Nations  Security  Council’s  Resolution  1566  (2004)
describes terroristic behavior as: 
“…criminal acts, including against civilians, committed with the intent to cause death  or  serious  bodily  injury,  or  taking  of
hostages, with the purpose to provoke a state of terror in the general public or in a group of persons or particular persons…”
Similarly, the United States federal law (United States Code, § 2331, 2007) characterizes terrorism as:
“…involve[ing] violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States  or  of
any State… intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; to influence the policy of a  government  by  intimidation  or
coercion; or to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping…”
The Terrorism Act 2000 of the United Kingdom’s Parliament (2000) describes terrorism as an action that:
“…involves serious violence against a person… serious damage to property… endangers a person’s life, other than that  of  the
person committing the action… creates a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or a section of the public.”
Although definitions of aggression  also  vary,  the  primary  component  is  the  intent  to  do  harm.  Terrorism  is
characterized by an additional element; the intent to instill fear in the target – whether the aggression  is  covert,  as  in
planning a terror attack, or overt, when carrying out the terror attack, the intent to  cause  fear  and  terror  is  typically
present. Given that acts of terrorism are often considered intentional and of  a  premeditated  nature,  theoretical  work
has justifiably focused on why and how such individuals can carry out such extreme acts of violence against  innocent
others.
However, it should be noted  that  defining  terrorism  has  been  a  subject  of  ongoing  debate  (Hoffman,  1998),
confounded  by  changes  in  meaning  of  the  term  throughout  history  and  cultural   and   political   differences   in
conceptualization of the  term.  For  example,  the  above  descriptions  represent  Western-centric  definitions,  which
typically attribute the terroristic behavior to illegitimate  groups  that  are  nation-less  (Tal  &  Yinon,  2009).  Islamic
definitions, in contrast, also consider acts of fear-inducing violence by militaristic states as  terrorism  (Tal  &  Yinon,
2009).
In the present chapter we provide an overview of extant theory  examining  the  psychological  roots  of  terrorism.
First, a psychological definition  of  aggression  and  its  relevance  to  terrorism  will  be  provided.  Next,  aggressive
typologies will be presented with a discussion of how these existing categories may fail to capture  the  complexity  of
terroristic behavior. In addition, we will present a new type of aggression,  called  programmatic  aggression,  that  we
argue sidesteps the shortcomings of these existing typologies. This will be followed by a discussion of  the  contended
role of personality and psychopathological factors  in  terroristic  behavior.  Next,  we  will  summarize  psychological
models  of  aggression,  including  the  frustration-aggression  hypothesis,  social-learning  theory,   and   the   general
aggression  model  (GAM)  and  explicate  how  these  have  been  applied  to   terrorism   along   with   their   relative
shortcomings. Finally, we will briefly suggest future directions for research, including areas of  research  that  may  be
particularly fruitful in their application  to  terroristic  aggression,  such  as  social  psychological  principles  of  group
behavior, and forensic work on risk assessment.
1. Defining and Studying Aggression                                and its Relevance to Terrorism
A number of definitions of aggression have been put forth. Some  of  these  definitions  include  covert  aggression
such as aggressive fantasies and plans, while others denote self-directed  aggression  or  aggressive  behavior  towards
inanimate  objects.  Many  definitions  are  influenced  by  the  academic  discipline  of  the  author  (i.e.,  psychology,
sociology, criminology, biology, etc)  and  the  aggression-related  mechanisms  studied,  while  other  definitions  use
aggression interchangeably with other terms such  as  violence,  hostility,  agitation,  anger,  etc.  Despite  the  various
descriptions used to capture and characterize aggression, and whether the aggressive behavior  is  physical,  mental  or
verbal, committed by individuals or groups, directed towards others, self, or inanimate objects, associated with mental
illness, antisocial personality characteristics, or  cultural,  political,  or  religious  views,  most  definitions  include  an
aspect of overt violent behavior with intent to cause damage, pain or harm (for a  thoughtful  discussion  on  the  topic
see Jan Volavka’s seminal book, Neurobiology of Violence, 2002, as well as Martin Ramirez:  Human  Aggression:  A
Multifaceted Phenomenon, 2003). It should also be noted that “harm” does not have to  be  limited  to  physical  harm,
but can also include psychological and emotional harm, and therefore, would encompass  the  intent  to  intimidate  or
instill fear in the target group. It is this definition of intent to cause physical and/or psychological harm that we use to
inform our discussion of terroristic aggression throughout the chapter.
When studying violent and aggressive behavior, particularly in humans, it is often examined from a perspective  in
which aggression is considered as a unitary construct and a categorical approach is used;  an  individual  or  individual
act is either aggressive or not, or a person has an “aggressive” personality type or not. Although simplistic, the  use  of
this type of framework in studying  aggression  has  the  advantage  of  being  parsimonious  and  facilitating  research
efforts, and accordingly, many measures of aggression use this approach. For instance, some theorists have  noted  the
nature of terroristic violence is consistent with what is called  “instrumental”  or  “reactive”  aggression,  one  form  of
violence in a bimodal theory of aggression. We  will  now  briefly  describe  this  bimodal  theory  of  aggression,  and
discuss how it may be relevant in furthering our understanding of terroristic violence.
1.1. Instrumental versus Reactive Aggression
The bimodal theory of aggression describes aggression as occurring in one of two forms (Barratt,  1991;  Stanford,
Houston, Mathias, Villemarette-Pittman, Helfritz, et al., 2003). The first  form  is  called  “reactive”  aggression  (also
referred to as impulsive,  expressive,  hostile,  unintentional,  or  affective  aggression)  and  occurs  in  response  to  a
perceived threat or provocation. It is characterized by a reaction of fear or  anger  with  autonomic  arousal,  a  loss  of
behavioral control (Barratt, 1991), and is normally immediate and defensive in nature (Meloy, 2006). The second type
is referred to as “instrumental” aggression (also called premeditated, intentional, predatory, proactive, or cold-blooded
aggression) and is goal-oriented, planful, tends to be characterized by the lack of or minimal emotional and autonomic
arousal (Stanford, Houston, Villemarette-Pittman, & Greve, 2003; Meloy, 2006), and is typically  offensive  in  nature
(Meloy, 2006).
This bimodal theory  of  aggression  is  supported  by  a  growing  body  of  empirical  research
(Meloy, 2006). Psychophysiologically, reactive aggressors appear to evidence increases in heart rate in response  to
a perceived provocation whereas instrumental aggressors do not (Gottman, Jacobson, Rushe, Shortt,  Babcock,  et  al.,
1995). Instrumental aggression has distinct  neurobiological  correlates  that  differ  from  that  of  reactive  aggression
(Blair, 2001;  2003).  Reactive  aggression  has  been  related  to  hyperactivity  in  the  amygdala  (Siever,  2008)  and
amygdala-orbitofrontal   cortex   dysfunction   (Coccaro,   McCloskey,    Fitzgerald,    &    Phan,    2007).    Amygdala
hypofunction, however, is more commonly related to instrumental  aggression  (Blair,  2001).  These  neurobiological
deficits appear linked to impaired processing of  distress-related  emotion  cues,  in  that  there  is  a  disruption  in  the
generation of appropriate responses to emotional stimuli. In other words, the  aggression-prone  individuals  may  lack
proper inhibition mechanisms for aggressive and violent behavior. Experts  have  speculated  that  reactive  aggressors
may lack executive control over their emotions  and  behavior  causing  them  to  react  violently  in  the  “heat  of  the
moment,” whereas instrumental aggressors do not lack executive control and, hence, engage in  more  “cold-blooded”
and calculated acts of violence (Raine, Meloy, Bihrle, Stoddard, LaCasse, et al., 1998).  In  terms  of  neurochemistry,
studies have shown that  noradrenergic  and  dopaminergic  systems  are  associated  with  the  facilitation  of  reactive
aggression  (McEllistrem,  2004),  while  cholinergic  systems  are  implicated   in   the   facilitation   of   instrumental
aggression (Miczek, 1987). In addition, neuropsychological studies  have  shown  that  reactive  aggressors  appear  to
demonstrate poorer verbal ability and intelligence than  their  instrumental  counterparts  (Barratt,  Stanford,  Kent,  &
Felthous, 1997; Vitiello, Behar, Hunt, Stoff, & Ricciuti, 1990). Taken together, these results provide strong  empirical
support for two forms of aggression with different underlying  psychophysiological,  neurobiological,  neurochemical,
and  neuropsychological  substrates  (for  a  deeper  analysis  of  this  dichotomous  categorization  of  aggression   see
Ramirez & Andreu, 2003; 2008).
It has not  escaped  the  attention  of  terrorism  researchers  that  terroristic  behavior  can  be
construed as a form of instrumental aggression; the outcome (harm to others) is often  secondary
to the primary politically-motivated goal of social change (Megargee, 1993). Similarly, the outcome  might
be secondary to other religious, social, and/or ideological goals. In  fact,  terroristic  acts  meet  many  of  the  defining
criteria  of  instrumental  aggression  according  to  Meloy’s  scheme  (2006).  More  specifically,  terroristic  acts   are
generally planned and purposeful, are not enacted in immediate response  to  a  perceived  instigating  event  (i.e.,  not
time limited) and accordingly, there  is  often  no  imminent  perceived  threat  from  the  enemy.  However,  there  are
theoretical  problems  when  attempting  to  directly  apply  this  dichotomous  typology  of  aggression  to   terroristic
behavior. Most importantly, reactive and instrumental  forms  of  aggression  are  typically  applied  to  individuals  or
individual acts. Therefore, applying the label of reactive or instrumental aggression to a specific terrorist or  terroristic
act may attempt to force an individual-level theoretical construct to  a  person/event  that  has  individual,  group,  and
societal-level motivational components.
At the individual-level, the dichotomization of each terrorist’s behavior as reactive or instrumental aggression may
obscure the dynamic nature of the motivations of the aggressive act(s). Each event may be composed of both  reactive
and instrumental motivational elements (Meloy, 2006), and the motivations of each terrorist  may  change  over  time.
For example, an individual’s initial reason for joining a terrorist organization (e.g., anger in  response  to  a  perceived
injustice) may change over time, particularly as the person becomes more enmeshed in the organization. At this point,
group-level influences may take on an increasingly salient role and the individual’s goals may shift more in  line  with
the group’s goals.
At the group-level (i.e., the terrorist organization), terrorist  acts  are  generally  categorized  as
instrumentally aggressive (Megargee, 1993). However, as  already  discussed,  reactively  or  instrumentally
motivated aggressive acts are typically limited to a  discrete  event  or  the  acts  of  one  individual,  whereas  terrorist
activities are often carried out over a protracted period of time and by numerous individual  members  of  the  terrorist
organization, both in solitary and cooperative efforts. Conceptualizing  terrorist  behavior  as  instrumental  aggression
does not adequately address the group- and societal-level influences in the commission of such behavior. Therefore,  a
more appropriate label may be programmatic aggression, a group-level expression  of  instrumental  aggression.  The
label of  programmatic  aggression  is  intended  to  make  no  assumptions  about  the  motivations  of  the  individual
terrorists, whom may be  motivated  by  reactive  and/or  instrumental  reasons.  Moreover,  programmatic  aggression
would  not  be  encumbered  by  the  time,  event,  and  person-limited  nature  of  the   individual-level   construct   of
instrumental aggression. Most importantly, it would allow for discussion and exploration of group- and  societal-level
influences  on   aggressive   behavior   as   enacted   by   a   collective   of   individuals.   Nonetheless,   although   this
characterization may be useful in describing terroristic aggression, it does not address the  etiological  factors  of  such
behavior. In the next section, we will present psychological theories that attempt to explicate the roots of  terror-based
aggression.
2. Etiological Theories of Terroristic Aggression
The etiological factors that underlie the development  of  terroristic  behavior  have  been  a  source  of  theoretical
contention for  over  four  decades  in  the  social  sciences  (Silke,  1998).  Psychological  theorists  have  debated  the
centrality of the role of personality or psychopathological factors in its development. While some experts have opined
that terrorists suffer from fundamental personality deficits or mental illness that  make  them  more  likely  to  affiliate
with  terrorist  organizations  and  engage  in  terroristic   activities,   others   argue   that   terrorists,   in   general,   are
psychologically “normal.” In this section, we summarize theoretical conceptualizations of the  terrorist  “personality,”
the role psychopathology may play in the development  of  terroristic  behavior,  as  well  as  the  methodological  and
theoretical limitations in these avenues of investigation.
2.1. Personality Factors
Much of the  psychological  research  over  the  past  four  decades  has  been  predicated  on  the  assumption  that
terrorists are psychologically different from non-terrorists, particularly in terms of their personality  make-ups  (Silke,
1998). This  conceptualization,  chiefly  derived  from  a  psychodynamic  or  psychoanalytic  perspective,  posits  that
certain individuals possess or lack  certain  personality  traits  that  make  them  more  susceptible  to  joining  terrorist
organizations and engaging in terroristic behavior than those individuals who do not  (Ruby,  2002).  This  personality
defect model asserts that this “type” of personality is largely the result of  a  dysfunctional  childhood  that  fosters  an
impoverished sense of self and hostility  toward  authority  (Ruby,  2002).  This  resentment  to  authority  may  be  an
outgrowth of unconscious hostility toward abusive or controlling parents, and is later reflected in the  adult  terrorist’s
rigid mindset (Kent & Nicholls, 1977).
In line with this conceptualization, Post (1984) referred to this  type  of  terrorist  as  an  “anarchic  ideologue,”  an
individual who is primarily motivated by an unconscious hostility toward authority figures (in this case,  the  target  of
the terroristic act(s)) due to a dysfunctional relationship with his or her parents, particularly  the  father.  However,  he
also posited an alternative pathway to terrorism, in which an individual, whom he termed a “nationalist  secessionist,”
experiences a relatively stable upbringing and healthy parental relationships, but instead seeks  violent  retribution  for
perceived wrongs perpetuated against his or her parents (Post, 1984).
Strentz (1981) delimited three prototypical terrorist personality profiles. The “Leader” is the  intellectual  force  or
“brains” of the terrorist operation and experiences an underlying sense of inadequacy that s/he  projects  onto  society.
Society, therefore,  is  viewed  as  inadequate  and  hence  a  logical  target  for  social  change.  The  “Opportunist”  is
characterized as the “muscle” of the group and often exhibits antisocial traits and  has  a  history  of  criminal  conduct
predating his or her affiliation with the terrorist organization. Finally, the “Idealist” is described as a young and  naïve
individual who is drawn to a terrorist organization in the hope of effecting political and/or social change.
Based on developmental theory, LoCicero and  Sinclair  (2007)  posit  a  more  social-developmental  approach  to
terrorism. They argue that the terrorist’s personality evolves  over  time,  and  is  not  influenced  by  one  domain  but
instead by various different factors including parents, peers, environment, etc. An individual may join  a  group  based
on basic non-violent religious or political views, or for other reasons, and it is in this group that a person’s ideology is
slowly shaped. However, if this group is, or becomes, involved in a violent  conflict,  in  which  the  enemy  might  be
viewed as evil, the individual’s group belongingness and her/his desire to be loyal may take precedence.  Further,  this
may result in re-shaping of the individual’s principles and consequently  lead  to  her/him  becoming  emerged  in  the
violent conflict as a terrorist/soldier fighting for the group’s ideology.
With respect to suicide bombers, a more specific  group  of  terrorists,  Meloy  and  colleagues
(2001,  2004)  have  suggested  that  many  can  be  described  as   “violent   true   believers”   or
individuals who are “committed to an ideology or belief system which advances  homicide-suicide
as  a  legitimate  means  to  further  a  particular  goal.”   These   individuals   are   typified   by   a
constellation of traits including: a belief and understanding  that  suicide  is  a  terroristic  weapon,
envious  impulse  (i.e.,  desire  to  damage/destroy  coveted  qualities   of   the   target),   helpless
dependence (on the target as an object of envy), a sense of omnipotence (with the power to  kill),
history of depression or despair (that will  fluctuate  prior  to  the  suicide  mission  and  degree  of
social isolation), sense of  entitlement  (reflected  by  disregard  of  human  life  and  inflated  self-
importance), possible psychopathy, capacity for emotional detachment,  paranoia,  a  sense  of  a
foreshortened  future  and  use  of  predatory  violence  to  achieve  goals  (Meloy,  2004;  Meloy,
Mohandie, Hempel, & Shiva, 2001).
Although other personality typologies have been offered  in  the  psychological  literature,  it  is
beyond the scope of this chapter  to  provide  an  exhaustive  account.  Nonetheless,  personality
deficit models reflect  the  primary  role  of  pathological  personality,  resulting  from  an  unstable
upbringing and hostility toward authority, in explaining why some individuals go on  to  engage  in
terroristic activities. However, other theorists argue that mental disorder,  particularly  personality  disorders,  may
play a prominent role in terroristic behavior (Borum, 2004). Ostensibly, the difference between these two  explanatory
models is the degree of  severity  of  personality  disturbance,  with  the  psychopathology  model  suggesting  a  more
extreme personality disturbance.
2.2 Psychopathological Factors and Personality Disorders
Although depressive and hypomanic disorders have  been  implicated  in  the  motivation  for  terroristic  behavior
(Turco, 1987), these have received less attention than other forms  of  psychopathology.  According  to  Silke  (1998),
attempts to explain terroristic behavior  in  terms  of  psychopathology  have  generally  focused  on  three  personality
disorders:  antisocial  personality   disorder   (and   psychopathy),   narcissistic   personality   disorder,   and   paranoid
personality disorder.
Antisocial personality disorder (ASPD), a disorder characterized by chronic disregard of  social
norms and laws, lack of remorse, impulsivity, and other traits, would  seem  a  suitable  diagnosis
for explaining terroristic behavior. Indeed, some researchers have opined that a subset of terrorists  would  meet
criteria for a diagnosis of ASPD, while many others would exhibit  traits  of  ASPD  without  meeting  full  diagnostic
criteria (Martens, 2004). Martens (2004) points out that  many  individuals  with  ASPD  share  certain  characteristics
with terrorists, such as a sense of social alienation, early maladjustment, impulsivity and hostility.
Psychopathy, although not an official diagnosis  in  the  Diagnostic  and  Statistical  Manual  of
Mental  Disorders  (DSM-IV;  American  Psychiatric  Association,  1994),  is   a   personality   and
behavioral syndrome that shares many features with ASPD, with an additional emphasis  on  less
observable personality variables, such as  emotional  callousness  and  manipulative  tendencies,
and has been implicated in terroristic behavior (Corrado, 1981; Pearce, 1977). Corrado (1981) opined
that psychopathy was one of  the  most  “prominent”  mental  disorders  associated  with  terrorists.  Similarly,  Pearce
(1977) suggested that terrorists are “aggressive psychopaths” who use a  political  cause  as  an  avenue  to  vent  their
frustrations over perceived wrongs and to engage in the domination and humiliation of others.
 In a review of research on  bombers  and  psychopaths,  Meloy  &  McEllistrem  (1998)  noted
similarities between the two groups  including:  an  inflated  sense  of  self-importance,  emotional
callousness, lack of remorse and a  proclivity  to  engage  in  criminal  conduct.  In  addition,  they
report that some bombers may evidence decreased autonomic  reactivity,  a  trait  often  found  in
habitual criminals and  psychopaths.  Finally,  they  found  that  bombers  tend  to  lack  a  future-
orientation, evidence poor long-term planning, and engage in predatory or “cold-blooded” acts  of
violence, hallmarks of a psychopathic personality. However, they are careful to note that most terrorists  are
not  psychopaths,  and  that  terrorist  bombers  also  evidence  certain  characteristics  that   differentiate   them   from
prototypical psychopaths. For instance, bombers tend to be socially isolated and  solitary  and  usually  subscribe  to  a
strong ideological belief system, traits  not  typically  associated  with  psychopaths.  They  suggest  that  the  passive-
aggressive use of  violence  (i.e.,  bombing)  and  avoidant  personality  traits  of  the  terrorist  bomber  may  reflect  a
phenotypic variant of the psychopathic genotype (Meloy & McEllistrem, 1998). Other  researchers  have  echoed  this
caveat with regard to terrorists in general, in  that  ASPD  or  psychopathy  may  be  represented  in  only  a  subset  of
terrorists, particularly in leaders (Martens, 2004). Even among these individuals, they tend  to  demonstrate  traits  that
would differentiate them from prototypical psychopaths, such as: a strong sense of loyalty to group  members,  use  of
violence  that  is  limited  to  targets  of  terror  and  not  specific  to  individuals  (e.g.,  governmental  or  bureaucratic
agencies), and ability to follow and execute long-term plans (in this case, campaigns of violence) (Martens, 2004).
Narcissistic  Personality  Disorder  has  also  been  used  to  explain  involvement  in   terrorist
behavior (Lasch, 1979; Pearlstein, 1991). Proponents of  this  view  point  out  that  although  antisocial  and
narcissistic personality disorders demonstrate some overlap in features such as lack of empathy and disregard  for  the
rights of others, terrorists also evidence a desire for admiration and attention, a hallmark of narcissism  (Ruby,  2002).
Their chosen methods of violence are often spectacular and attention grabbing, suggesting a more narcissistic  clinical
presentation (Ruby, 2002). Other theorists argue that  narcissistic  traits,  particularly  in  combination  with  antisocial
traits, may be more common among terrorist leaders,  and  not  necessarily  among  terrorists  in  general  (Johnson  &
Feldmann, 1992). These individuals  may  engage  in  what  is  called  narcissistic  aggression,  a  form  of  aggression
motivated by psychological injuries to their ego (Ross, 1996).
Finally,  Paranoid  Personality  Disorder,  a  clinical  picture  characterized  by  marked  suspiciousness,  irrational
mistrust of others, rigidity in beliefs, and an unwillingness to compromise, has been associated  with  terrorists  (Silke,
1998). Given the rigid  and  extreme  ideological  belief  systems,  often  centered  around  themes  of  oppression  and
persecution that terrorists often espouse, paranoid personality disorder would seem  a  logical  fit  (Turco,  1987).  Not
surprisingly, experts tend to agree  that  paranoid  personality  disorder  may  be  more  common  among  leaders  than
among non-leaders of terrorist organizations (Johnson & Feldmann, 1992; Turco, 1987), ostensibly due to the  greater
material and social resources, such as prestige, the leaders stand to lose.
Although much attention has been paid to the possible personality and  psychopathological  factors
that may facilitate the development of terroristic behavior, some critics also argue  that  personality  traits  and  mental
illness that predisposes an individual to become a terrorist is largely inaccurate. Reid (2003), for example, argues  that
the attempt to psychologically profile the typical terrorist is simply  an  attempt  to  “figure  them  out”,  but  “wishing
doesn’t make it  so”  (p.  285).  Other  critics  of  the  personality/  psychopathology  approach  discount  this  body  of
research on methodological and theoretical grounds, which we discuss further in the following section.
2.3. Methodological and Theoretical Problems of the Personality Defect and Psychopathology
Models of Terrorism
In terms of methodology, many critics point out  that  many  personality  defect  and  psychopathology  models  of
terrorism and terrorists largely rely on anecdotal evidence or lack empirical  support  (i.e.,  suffer  from  small  sample
sizes) (Crenshaw, 2000), or derive personality profiles from  secondary  sources  of  information,  such  as  interviews
with family members or archival records (Silke, 1998). Indeed, Meloy (2006)  qualified  the  entire  body  of  research
regarding the personalities and motivations of bombers as “anecdotal,  descriptive,  and  conjectural,”  and  resting  on
“expert authority, not  science”  (p.  561).  Conversely,  studies  that  have  employed  more  stringent  methodological
standards have found that terrorists are  largely  indistinguishable  from  non-terrorists,  both  in  terms  of  personality
(Horgan, 2003; Taylor & Quayle, 1994) and mental health (Borum, 2004). In one of  the  only  studies  of  its  kind  in
which incarcerated terrorist murderers were compared to a control group of incarcerated  non-terrorist  murderers,  the
terrorist group evidenced more psychological stability  and  less  psychopathology,  and  tended  to  come  from  more
stable family backgrounds than their non-terrorist counterparts (Lyons & Harbinson, 1986).
When researchers have examined terrorists directly,  findings  have  supported  the  view  that
terrorists are psychologically “normal” relative to non-terrorists (Ferracuti & Bruno, 1983;  Heskin,
1994; Rasch, 1979). Moreover, when psychopathology is present in terrorists, they  typically  employ  peripheral
functions in the terrorist organization (Silke, 1998). Ruby (2002) also points out that in the  rare  case  that  a  terrorist
does meet diagnostic criteria for a mental disorder, it may be the result of affiliating  and  socializing  with  a  terrorist
organization and not a causal  reason  for  joining  one.  Reid  (2003)  speculates  that  most  individuals  who  become
involved in terroristic acts “do not have more psychological flaws than most criminals.”
Theoretically,  opponents  of  the  personality  defect  and  psychopathological  models  of   terrorism   argue   that
attributing terrorist behavior to  internal  characteristics,  such  as  personality  disorders  and/or  mental  illness,  is  an
application of the “fundamental attribution error” (Eisen, 1979). In other words, proponents of  these  models  tend  to
ascribe terroristic behavior  to  personological  factors  of  the  individual  terrorists,  while  discounting  the  role  that
contextual or structural variables may play in the commission of such behavior (Atran,  2003;  Silke,  1998).  There  is
now general consensus in the terrorism research community  that  empirical  attention  needs  to  incorporate  multiple
levels of analysis, including individual, group, and societal levels (Crenshaw, 2000).  Crenshaw  (1992,  2000)  argues
that when  these  levels  of  analysis  are  incorporated,  terroristic  behavior  appears  psychologically  normative  and
rational given the  sociopolitical  climate  in  which  many  of  these  terrorists  live.  This  view  is  in  support  of  the
aforementioned social-developmental model proposed by LoCicero and Sinclair (2007), which emphasizes  numerous
factors of influence on a person’s ideology.
In  sum,  modern  etiological  theories  of  terroristic  behavior   seem   to   discount   individual
personality and/or psychopathological factors in explaining terroristic behavior, and instead  favor
group- and societal-level factors. However, psychology has the ability to contribute additional  theoretical  and
empirical work that may have a direct  bearing  on  the  genesis  of  terroristic  behavior,  particularly  with  respect  to
aggression.
Psychology has forwarded many theoretical models to account for aggression.  In  terms  of  explaining  terroristic
behavior, three schools of thought have  received  particular  attention:  the  frustration-aggression  hypothesis,  social
learning theory, and the general aggression model (or GAM). In the next few sections, we will provide an overview of
each theoretical position along with how it has or could be applied  to  explain  terroristic  behavior  and  discuss  each
school’s relative weaknesses.
2.4. The Frustration-Aggression Hypothesis
The frustration-aggression hypothesis was forwarded in  1939  in  an  effort  to  explain  aggression  in  its  totality
(Dollard, Doob, Miller, Mowrer,  &  Sears,  1939).  The  basic  premise  of  this  hypothesis  opined  that  any  and  all
instances of aggression were the result of frustration, which was conceptualized as any event/stimulus that prevents an
individual  from  attaining  some  goal  and  its  accompanying  reinforcing  quality.   These   authors   stipulated   that
frustration was a necessary condition  for  aggression,  but  contextual  factors,  such  as  threat  of  punishment,  could
inhibit aggressive responding (Dollard et al., 1939). However, even when an  aggressive  response  is  suppressed,  the
use of non-aggressive strategies may fail to achieve the desired goal and therefore be extinguished, and an  aggressive
behavior would become the dominant response (Miller, 1941).  Since  its  original  conceptualization,  this  hypothesis
has been applied to terroristic behavior.
Most notably, Gurr (1968, 1970)  suggested  that  “relative  deprivation,”  or  a  subjective  sense  of  being
deprived of certain needs  or  freedoms  by  a  domestic  or  international  governing  body,  can  result  in  feelings  of
frustration. Moreover, if these feelings of frustration are left to  percolate,  they  can  eventually  culminate  in  acts  of
violence and terrorism (Margolin, 1977).
Berkowitz  (1989)   reframed   the   frustration-aggression   hypothesis   in   light   of   cognitive
neoassociationist theory. Essentially, he argued that it is not the frustration stimulus or event per  se  that  causes
aggression, but rather the negative affect that is experienced when frustrated. Initially, a frustration or  aversive  event
will generate diffuse negative affect in an individual with  concomitant  physiological  and  memory-related  reactions
associated to fight or flight (Berkowitz, 1989, 1990). At this point, cognition  plays  a  minimal  role,  only  serving  to
invest the affect with its negative valence. The cognitive-neoassociationist piece of this model proposes that  concepts
and ideas form nodes that are “networked” in memory, such that related concepts (and their emotions) are  connected;
stimulation of one network node will stimulate related nodes. Berkowitz (1989, 1990)  argues  that  negative  affect  is
conceptually linked to aggression-related “nodes” in the individual’s mnemonic networks.  Therefore,  the  experience
of negative affect will stimulate aggression-related ideas/concepts (for further discussion on  important  psychological
constructs  related  to  aggression,  see  Ramirez  &  Andreu,  2006),  making  them  more  readily  accessible  for  the
individual to use in guiding his or her behavior, thereby increasing the likelihood that the  individual  will  aggress.  In
this way, it is suggested that negative  affect  in  general,  and  not  just  anger,  will  increase  the  probability  that  an
individual will behave aggressively.
Following this initial and more  automatic  experience  of  diffuse  negative  affect,  an  individual  can  engage  in
effortful elaboration on the meaning of the situation. In other words, an individual can evaluate the situation  in  terms
of whom or what is the source of the frustration, whether the frustration was intentional and what response options are
available and desirable.
Moreover, Berkowitz (1989, 1990) asserts that learning  experiences  will  likely  influence  the
process of attributing meaning to the situation. It is  this  stage  of  the  process  that  may  be  of  particular
relevance to terroristic behavior. Ostensibly, the socialization processes in a  terrorist  organization  will  likely  foster
and encourage attributing hostility to the actions  of  their  enemies,  even  if  ambiguous.  Cognitively,  the  consistent
social reinforcement of this type of thinking provided by the terrorist  group  would  strengthen  connections  between
negative affect, aggression-related ideas and the enemy. Therefore, over  time,  the  terrorists  association  of  negative
feelings and ideas with the enemy would become more intense, potentiating aggressive retaliation.
However, Berkowitz (1989) cautions that  the  cognitive-neoassociationistic  adaptation  of  the
frustration-aggression hypothesis  is  best  suited  in  helping  to  explain  reactive  aggression.  In
addition, although the model affords room  for  learning  experiences  in  shaping  aggressive  tendencies,  it  does  not
explicitly address societal or group-level influences in explaining terroristic behavior. Finally, it does  not  provide  an
explanation as to why terrorists are capable of such sensationalistically cruel acts of violence against  targets  who  are
not directly responsible for their frustration. In order to shed light on these issues, we now turn our attention  to  social
learning theory.
2.5. Social Learning Theory
Social learning theory proposes that much of human behavior, including aggression, is learned through socializing
with  and  observing  others,  and  “modeling”  or  mimicking  such  behavior  (Bandura,  1978).  Depending  on  their
developmental history, individuals will be differentially reinforced or punished for the use of  aggressive  behavior.  It
is  these  differential  histories  of  reinforcement  and  punishment  that   shape   an   individual’s   propensity   toward
aggression.
In terms of terrorism, Bandura (1990, 2004) asserts that socialization within terrorist  organizations  facilitates  the
use of extremely violent behavior  through  learning  specific  mechanisms  of  moral  disengagement.  He  states  that
humans typically internalize personal moral  standards  that  guide  their  behavior,  and  violation  of  these  standards
causes self-condemnation. Accordingly, individuals are motivated to avoid self-derogation by adhering to these moral
standards. In terms of violence, internalized  social  norms  encourage  restraint  from  violence,  particularly  extreme
forms that can lead to the death of others. However,  terrorists  are  socialized  in  specific  ways  that  permit  them  to
suspend or “disengage” from these moral  standards,  even  if  their  violence  is  directed  at  innocent  members  (i.e.,
typically civilians) of the target group of their hostility.
One of the principle ways in which terrorists learn to morally disengage  from  the  implications
of their violent actions is to reframe the moral meaning of the  violent  behavior.  In  other  words,  by
learning to justify the use of violence as morally defensible, such as by invoking patriotic or  ideological  rhetoric,  the
normally morally reprehensible action is reframed as morally legitimate  and  even  necessary.  For  example,  Islamic
extremists have explained their terrorist actions as a  defensive  response  to  encroaching  attempts  of  Westerners  to
control the Muslim world. Alternatively, terrorist groups may make appeals  to  utilitarian  logic  such  that  their  own
acts of violence are deemed necessary in order to prevent greater and more  atrocious  acts  of  violence  from  another
instigating group (i.e., Westerners in the latter example); in essence, it becomes  a  simple  calculus  involving  human
life (Bandura, 1990, 2004).
Terrorists may also engage in what Bandura (1990, 2004)  calls  “advantageous  comparison,”
which involves contrasting their own acts of terrorism with acts  committed  by  other  groups  that
appear more reprehensible. In effect, this contrasting process softens the severity and moral weight of their own
terrorist act. In a similar vein, terrorists may use euphemistic language to minimize the  perceived  impact  of  terrorist
behavior in terms of both morality and human life. The use of such language minimizes or eliminates connotations  of
harm and responsibility.
In addition, Bandura (1990, 2004) argues that  terrorists  employ  techniques  to  both  displace  and
diffuse their personal sense of responsibility in their terroristic actions. Terrorists may rationalize their acts  as  having
been mandated by some authority greater than themselves, such as a  leader,  ideological  principle,  or  deity,  thereby
shifting responsibility to the authority figure. In addition, some  terrorist  organizations  are  hierarchically  structured,
entailing division of labor. This division of labor serves to parse out different functions and roles,  therefore,  any  one
individual is only responsible for their small contribution to the total terrorist act. In  this  way,  responsibility  for  the
final act is shared by, and thereby minimized for each member of the terrorist organization who  was  involved  in  the
terrorist act.
Bandura (1990, 2004) also notes that terrorist organizations and their individual  members  are
indoctrinated into an ideological system that dehumanizes their enemies.  He  points  out  that  as  we
invest others with shared human qualities, we facilitate an  empathic  connection  with  them.  Conversely,  casting  an
individual or group of individuals as  subhuman  or  as  lacking  in  common  human  qualities,  terrorists  are  able  to
divorce themselves from normal  empathic  constraints  on  inflicting  harm  on  these  individuals.  Accordingly,  this
negates or depresses their own personal moral  sanctions  against  harming  another  human  being.  Finally,  terrorists
often minimize or simply ignore the harmful impact their actions may have on their targets of terror.
In sum, Bandura’s social learning model  and  mechanisms  of  moral  disengagement  help  in
explaining why terrorists, who for the most part are psychologically “normal”, are capable of  such
extreme violence against innocent targets. However, it does not appear to provide as detailed an  analysis  as
Berkowitz’s  reformulation  of  the  frustration-aggression  hypothesis  of  the  individual  level  processes  or   factors
involved in the decision to engage in terroristic behavior, such as  emotion.  More  recently,  the  General  Aggression
Model (Anderson & Bushman, 2002), has been developed in an attempt to incorporate  social  learning  theory,  social
cognition and biological factors in aggression.
2.6. General Aggression Model (GAM)
The General Aggression Model (GAM) is a biosocial model  of  aggression  that  includes  social  learning,  social
cognitive, and biological mechanisms to explain aggression. This model conceptualizes aggression as  occurring  as  a
synergy of three influences: inputs, present internal state, and outputs (Anderson & Bushman, 2002).
Inputs consists of both situational information and personological factors.  In  terms  of  situational
information, cues in the environment  can  serve  to  facilitate  or  inhibit  the  potential  for  aggression  (Anderson  &
Carnagey, 2004). For instance, a frustrating event or situation in which expectations for  aggression  are  made  salient
(e.g., a sporting event or verbal  provocation)  will  create  an  environment  conducive  to  aggression.  In  addition  to
situational factors, the individual also brings their own attitudes, beliefs and personality to the mix, the latter of which
may be partially biologically influenced (Anderson & Bushman, 2002; Anderson & Carnagey, 2004).
It  should  be  noted  that  this  model  conceptualizes  personality  as  a  collection   of   stable
knowledge structures  that  an  individual  holds  and  uses  to  interpret  the  world  around  them
(Anderson & Bushman, 2002). Proponents of this  model  argue  that  an  individual  may  inherit  a  biological
proclivity to learn and maintain aggression-related knowledge structures, i.e., develop an aggressive  personality  type
(Anderson & Carnagey, 2004). Importantly, this  model  posits  that  personality,  i.e.,  knowledge  structures,  can  be
changed over  time  through  social  learning  processes.  In  other  words,  the  social  environment  can  influence  an
individual’s beliefs, attitudes, and personality or how they perceive the world.
Inputs, in turn, serve to influence the present internal state of the  individual  in  response  to  a
given situation. A person’s pre-existing personality, beliefs, and  attitudes  will  affect  how  they  feel,  think,  and
physiologically react to a situation, which in turn will influence the individual’s behavior, or outcome, in the situation.
In the outcome stage of the GAM, individuals appraise the situation and arrive at a  behavioral
decision (Anderson & Bushman, 2002). Individuals may engage in two types of appraisals. The first type is  a
more “automatic” form of appraisal that involves little thought or weighing of alternative response options that results
in some type of impulsive behavior, most likely aggression. Automatic appraisals typically occur when  an  individual
does not have time, or the emotional and/or cognitive capacity to  think  a  situation  through;  therefore,  this  type  of
appraisal is most likely to lead to reactive aggression. The second type of appraisal is referred to as  “reappraisal”  and
involves an individual considering alternative response options  that  may  or  may  not  include  non-aggressive  ones.
This does not imply that the individual is less likely to aggress, rather, they are more likely to  think  about  what  they
are doing before they decide upon a course of action (Anderson & Bushman, 2002; Anderson & Carnagey, 2004).
In terms of terroristic behavior, this  model  appears  to  offer  a  more  comprehensive  theoretical  framework  for
understanding the genesis of terroristic behavior. With respect  to  the  situational  information  component  of  inputs,
terrorists are socialized in an environment that promotes aggressive and violent acts against a specified target.  In  this
way, they are embedded in a context that is replete with overt and covert cues  that  facilitate  the  use  of  violence,  at
least against a select target.
GAM also provides a framework for understanding, albeit speculatively, as to why an individual  joins  a  terrorist
organization and how their ideological beliefs become  more  extreme  over  time.  By  examining  the  personological
component of the input  stage  of  the  GAM,  we  can  begin  to  shed  light  on  these  two  processes.  As  previously
mentioned, GAM asserts that  certain  individuals  may  show  a  biological  predilection  to  constructing  aggression-
related knowledge structures (i.e., forming an “aggressive personality”) (Anderson & Carnagey, 2004). It may  be  the
case that individuals who become motivated to join a terrorist organization are those individuals who are  more  likely
(from the perspective of a biological predisposition) to become  angered  and  motivated  to  action  by  the  perceived
persecution by a perceived enemy. Once the individual has begun to affiliate with or  joined  a  terrorist  group,  social
learning processes can then exert their effects in further modifying their knowledge structures,  beliefs,  and  attitudes.
More specifically, the dogmatic demonization of an  enemy  in  a  terrorist  group  serves  to  reinforce  the  individual
terrorist’s  existing  associations  among  aggression-related  concepts,  negative  affect  and  the  enemy   in   memory
networks. Over time, what  may  have  begun  as  a  somewhat  effortful  cognitive  exercise  (i.e.,  contemplating  and
ruminating over the evil nature of the enemy)  will  become  less  effortful  as  these  associations  are  reinforced  and
strengthened through socialization within the terrorist group, to the point of automaticity. Moreover,  it  would  appear
feasible that it is during this socialization process that individuals are psychologically and ideologically trained in  the
forms of moral disengagement that Bandura (1990, 2004) argues are necessary to commit terroristic acts. As becomes
evident, the socialization processes in a terrorist organization will afford situational  cues  and  modify  personological
factors that will encourage violence against a selected enemy.
The GAM posits that input variables will influence the present internal state of the individual. In
terms  of  the  terrorist,  the  input  variables  will  serve  to  facilitate  negative  feelings,  thoughts,  and  physiological
reactions (likely related to anger and/or fear) toward the enemy, which in turn will  affect  the  appraisal  and  decision
making processes in the outcome stage.
The  previous  two  stages  will  have  a  direct  effect  on  how  the  terrorist   appraises,   both
automatically and in terms of reappraising, their  previous,  current,  and  future  interactions  with
their perceived enemy. However, given that terroristic violence is not  typically  impulsive/reactive
in nature, appraisals and decisions in this stage of the GAM are more likely  to  be  influenced  by
reappraisal processes and not automatic ones. In other words, terrorists are likely to reflect  upon  previous
wrongs inflicted upon them by their enemy, which will reinforce their image of the enemy as a source of  persecution,
thereby making decisions to retaliate violently easier and more likely.
The GAM, given its incorporation of multiple domains of psychological  theory  on  aggression,  provides  a  more
comprehensive analysis of aggression. As a result, when applied to terroristic aggression, it  appears  to  offer  a  more
complete  explanatory  model  than  either  the  frustration-aggression  hypothesis  or  social   learning   theory   alone.
Nonetheless, similar to the frustration-aggression hypothesis and social learning theory,  it  fails  to  account  for  how
group dynamics  and  societal  level  influences  generate  and  affect  terroristic  behavior.  Although  it  accounts  for
influences of socialization on the pre-existing and developing mindset of the individual terrorist, it does  not  examine
how group-level behavior or  sociocultural  and  political  conditions  foster  the  growth  of  terrorist  individuals  and
organizations. However, this criticism is not unique  to  the  GAM,  but  to  all  of  the  theories  previously  discussed.
Therefore (and this argument is  hardly  new)  it  becomes  incumbent  upon  researchers  on  the  field  to  incorporate
multiple levels of  analysis,  including  individual,  group,  and  societal  levels  when  attempting  to  provide  a  fuller
account of terroristic behavior.
3. New Methods for Research on Terrorism                    and Terrorists
In  terms  of  describing  terroristic  aggression,  assigning   it   a   label   according   to   the   reactive/instrumental
dichotomization appears insufficient to capture the nature of such behavior. Therefore, we have proposed a third  type
of  aggression  called  programmatic  aggression  that  asserts  terroristic  behavior  is  a  unique  type  of  instrumental
aggression as performed by a collective of individuals, characterized by a dynamic interplay of individual,  group  and
societal level influences. In explaining the generation and escalation of terroristic behavior, it would appear the  GAM
provides the most comprehensive (albeit untested) framework. But as many  other  researchers  have  argued,  existing
theoretical  explanations  for  terrorism  are  too  focused  on  one  level  of  analysis  (e.g.,  Ross,  1993,  1994);  most
psychological models, including the GAM, fail to fully account for group-level  or  even  acknowledge  societal  level
influences. Addressing the former concern, Pynchon & Borum (1999) provide an excellent review  and  much  needed
first step in attempting to explain how social psychological principles of  group  behavior  can  be  applied  to  explain
terrorism.
Perhaps  threat  assessment  of  terrorism  can  benefit  from  decades  of  sophisticated  research  in  violence  risk
assessment in  forensic  psychology  and  psychiatry.  Forensic  risk  assessment  does  not  explain  aggression  or  its
etiology. Rather, it  predicts  future  violence  by  looking  at  factors  that  are  associated  with  future  risk,  using  an
individual’s sociological,  psychological,  and  biological  history  and  current  life  context.  However,  this  body  of
research has examined risk for violence in individuals and not organizations; nonetheless,  it  may  prove  a  beneficial
starting point for future research efforts in examining  group-level  risk  assessment.  For  example,  some  researchers
have opined that  individuals  that  engage  in  targeted  violence  (i.e.,  plan  to  harm  only  one  or  multiple  specific
individuals) may often follow a sequence of  behaviors  “on  a  path  toward  violence”  (Borum,  Fein,  Vossekuil,  &
Berglund,   1999).   Identifying   analogous   sequences   of   behavior   that   precede   terrorist   acts,    both    at    the
organizational/group and individual level  would  provide  critical  data  toward  informing  prevention  efforts.  In  an
exciting move in this direction, Pynchon and Borum (1999) provide a tentative guideline on how social psychological
principles of group behavior can be applied to risk assessment of terrorist groups. Additional theoretical and empirical
work is sorely needed in this area in order predict and ultimately prevent future acts of terroristic violence.
4. Conclusion
We have provided a summary of  psychological  theory  in  both  describing  and  explaining  terroristic  behavior.
Attempts to describe terroristic behavior in terms of a bimodal theory of aggression (i.e.,  reactive  or  instrumental  in
nature) appear insufficient given their neglect of group  and  societal-level  influences  in  explaining  aggression.  We
forward a third type of aggression, called programmatic aggression, in order to address this shortcoming.
In terms of etiological factors in terroristic aggression, it appears that previous attempts, particularly in terms  of  a
“terrorist personality” or mental illness, have largely failed. Moreover, psychologically grounded  etiological  theories
of aggression may be limited in their utility in explaining  terroristic  aggression  due  to  their  primary  focus  on  the
individual-level of analysis. While these theories do attempt to account for socialization processes (i.e.,  a  group-level
influence) in the development of terrorism, they do not  do  so  to  a  sufficient  degree;  more  importantly,  they  only
indirectly or completely ignore the  influence  of  sociocultural  and  political  factors  in  generating  and  maintaining
terroristic behavior. Finally, social psychology of group behavior and the literature  on  violence  risk  assessment  can
offer useful starting points in extending our knowledge  of  causes  of  terroristic  aggression,  and  inform  prevention
efforts.
“The one and only unquestionable value that can be appreciated independently of rational morality or education is the  bond  of
human love and friendship from which all kindness and charity springs, and which represents the antithesis to aggression.”
—Lorenz, On Aggression, 1966, pg. 276.
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Endnote
1
 Although the history of terrorism (the act of terroristic behavior by groups) clearly dates back further than the  French  Revolution
and the Reign of Terror (e.g., see Terrorism Research, 2009), we are in this chapter referring to what  many  scholars  consider  the
epoch when the term was initially commonly accepted and popularized (Hoffman, 1998). However, it should also be noted that the
term “terror,” which stems from the Latin word meaning “to frighten,” was used as early as 105BC by Romans to  describe  attacks
by warriors of the Germanic Cimbri tribe (terror cimbricus) (Gjerset, 1969).
